Six New Opinions from the Nevada Supremes
The Nevada Supreme Court issued six published opinions today:
In Schuster v. Dist. Ct., the Court denied a writ for habeas seeking dismissal of an indictment because the grand jury was no instructed on the theory of self defense. The Court rejected the argument that the grand jury must, in addition to being presented exculpatory evidence, must also be instructed as to the legal significance of that evidence. The Court held that such instruction would expand the grand jury’s role from investigatory and accusatory to an adjudicatory.
In Callie v. Bowling, the Court held that a judgment creditor in a domesticated foreign judgment may not add a nonparty to a final judgment under the alter ego doctrine, simply by moving to amend the judgment, as such a procedure violates the due process rights of the nonparty. An independent action is required.
In Valdez v. Employers Ins. Co. of Nev., the Court substitutes this opinion for that that originally issue in this case November 9, 2006, but does not change the outcome. The Court concludes that conclude that “physician choice under the managed-care system is a procedural and remedial means of administering an injured worker’s vested right to workers’ compensation.”
In Matter of Discipline of Droz, the Court approved the recommendation that Utah attorney Paul Droz, never licensed in Nevada, be enjoined from practicing law in Nevada or appearing in any Nevada court.\
In Arata v. Faubion, the Court upheld the constitutionality of NRS 41.440, which imposes vicarious liability upon the owners of car who loan the vehicles to immediate family members, as the statute is rationally related to a legitimate purpose.. However, the court remanded the cause of action here for factual findings to determine whether a step parent of an adult living in the same home falls with the “other immediate family member” language of the statute.
In Ellis v. Carucci, the Court modifies the test for a change in physical custody of a minor child to require (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) with the modification serving the best interests of the child.
