Today's Nevada Supreme Court Opinions
The Nevada Supreme Court issued three published opinions today, August 2, 2007
In State v. Ruscetta, the Court clarified that the proper test in cases involving consensual vehicular searches is one that examines the totality of the circumstances for objective reasonableness . The court “retreats” from its decision in State v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 78, 993 P.2d 44 (2000), to the extent that opinion held that dismantling a car during a search is per se unreasonable. The matter here was remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the officer’s movement of an unsecured (i.e., already dismantled) center console was objectively unreasonable in a consent search of a vehicle.
In Gallegos v. State, the court held that NRS 202.360(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague and fails to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The ruling reverse the conviction for one count of possession of a firearm. The statute is vague as it criminalizes possession of a firearm by a “fugitive from justice” but does not define that term. The court stated “We cannot determine from the statute’s provisions whether the person has to have been formally charged with a crime, be wanted as a suspect but not yet indicted, be guilty of a crime but not yet discovered, be wanted for general questioning relating to a crime, or whether the person even has to know he has committed a crime.”
In Marcuse v. Del Webb Communities, the Court held that unnamed class members have standing to object to a settlement in the class action, and have standing to appeal court approval of the settlement. Such standing is conferred because the class members are parties to the action’ moreover, where there is no opportunity to opt out, any settlement would resolve the rights of the unnamed class members. Here, the district court properly approved of the settlement in the action. However, the Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal of a subsequent action filed by the Appellants, because “the respondent represented that the appellants could file a second action for their claims that exceeded the constructional defect class action’s scope, and therefore respondent is judicially estopped from arguing that the action should be dismissed on res judicata grounds.”
