Statistical bias as basis for recusal?
A plaintiff in Texas has moved to recuse four (out of nine) justices of the Texas Supreme Court, based upon a statistical analysis of Court opinions involving tort cases concluding there is a defense bias on the court. Click here to download the motion, posted online by Appellate Law & Practice
The motion certainly offers a creative approach, but I doubt whether a statistical analysis could, or even, should warrant recusals. The description of the article certainly makes some persuasive points. Particularly compelling are the number of cases where plaintiffs’ verdicts were overturned, with the Supreme Court reversing both the appellate and district court findings that there was sufficient probative evidence to sustain the verdict.
However, the “qualitative” analysis isn’t qualitative enough for me. I have questions. For example, I wonder if the reasons evidence did not suffice had to do with something other than “Was this really enough evidence?” Was evidence deemed inadmissible on evidentiary grounds, or did a particular claim have some heightened standard that had to be met – something other than mere disagreement about when enough is enough. In other words, I think I’d have to review the same opinions myself before I could be convinced of bias.
Which leads me back to whether statistical analysis should play a part in recusals. Imagine the flurry of motions that would result at the U.S. Supreme Court.
The article describing the statistical analysis, "Judicial Tort Reform in Texas," 26 Rev. Lit. 1 (2007), by University of Texas law professor David Anderson, is not available online. However, click here for a summary of thee article posted by the Austin firm of Perlmutter & Schuelke.
Hat tip to Appellate Law & Practice
