September 19, 2007 Ninth Circuit opinions.
On September 19, 2007, the Ninth Circuit issued five new published opinions:
In Melendez v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit held that an alien may not avoid immigration consequences of a drug conviction as a time offender, when he is not a first time offender. Here, following an earlier arrest, Melendez had taken advantage of a pre-trial program under a diversion scheme that did not require him to plead guilty. The Court held that the BIA properly regarded Melendez as one who had gotten “two bites at the ameliorative apple.”
In Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, held that a crime involving moral turpitude must be a crime that is 1) vile, base, or depraved and 2) violates societal moral standard s. California’s offense of “accessory after the fact” does not qualify. Accordingly, Navarro-Lopez had not been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and could be eligible for cancellation of removal.
In Menken v. Emm, the Ninth Circuit held that while domesticating a judgment in unlikely, without more, to be sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, that act coupled with additional conduct, such as, as alleged here, attempted to exact a higher payment than the judgment amount, does established sufficient minimum contacts to confer jurisdiction.
In Brown v. Ornoski, the Ninth Circuit denied habeas relief in a death penalty matter, finding that Brown received effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. While the psychologist portrayal of Brown was not positive, it was more sympathetic than that presented by the prosecution, and therefore represented a strategic choice. The Court rejected the claim that counsel should have conducted more background information, as there is little indication that exposure of the jury to the additional would have changed the outcome.
In E. &J. Gallo v. EnCana Corp. , the Ninth Circuit held that the filed rate doctrine did not apply to transactions not subject to FERC jurisdiction. Here, Gallo’s claims included transactions not based on F$RC rates; accordingly, the District Court properly denied summary judgment.
