Christmas decisions
While I was enjoying Christmas with all three of our kids (plus my daughter’s boyfriend, who might as well be one of our kids, since he’s been around since she was in 10th grade), the Nevada Supreme Court issued five published opinions:
In Nellis Motors v. State, DMV, the Court determined that the required evidentiary standard for administratively revoking emission-inspector and emission-station licenses is by a preponderance of the evidence, upholding the revocation here.
In Sheriff v. Burcham, the Court determined that the appropriate standard for finding a driver to have been “under the influence” for purposes of the offence of felony driving under the influence (DUI) pursuant to NRS 484.3795(1)(a) and (b) remains “impaired to a degree which renders the driver incapable of driving safely,” even though the Nevada legislature had amended the statute since the Court last set froth the standard. The Court also determined that expert testimony was not necessary to explain to a grand jury the concept of retrograde extrapolation based on evidence that a second blood-alcohol concentration test, was lower than the first test and was the below the 0.08 standard.
In In re Lerner, the Court publicly reprimanded Heavy Hitter Greg Lerner for contributing to the unlicensed practice of law by an attorney licensed in Arizona, but not Nevada. The attorney in question worked in Lerner’s office, serving Nevada clients; no harm to the clients was alleged. Seems Lerner received three private reprimands for the same conduct, so the Court hopes a public admonishment will serve to curb the conduct.
In Howell v. State Engineer, the Court upheld the denial of a writ of mandamus requested after the state engineer refused to adjudicate water rights. The Court found the state engineer has no authority to make such an adjudication, as NRS 533.024(2) requires a court of competent jurisdiction to make such adjudication.
In Settelmeyer & Sons v. Smith & Harmer, the Court addressed a number of issues related to recovery of attorneys fees for representation of a corporation in a separate receivership and dissolution actions. The Court determined that such attorneys fees may be recovered in an actions separate from the receivership claims process, but the court in the separate action must obtain permission of the receivership action to levy on receivership funds. The Court also determined that a law firm may not recover attorneys fees for representation of itself.
