Attorneys fees for services rendered- to whom?
The 9th Circuit took an interesting view of the quantum meruit value of services performed by a firm that referred a case to another firm.
Crockett & Myers v. Napier involved a dispute between the Crockett, the local firm, and Napier, a New York firm, over the referral fee. The New York firm referred the client to the local firm, and the two firms, with the client's permission, agreed to split any contingency fee received 50-50. But the client fired the New York firm more than a year before settlement.
After a settlement apparently worth roughly half a million to the attorneys, Crockett sought to reduce Napier’s share, as the latter’s participation in actual work on the case had been limited. Judge Pro limited Napier’s share to $33,000. That amount was based on quantum meriut, i.e., the value of the services, which the District Court based on the value to the client of Napier’s selection of competent counsel and its persuasion of Crockett to reduce the customary contingency fee.
The 9th Circuit upheld the limitation of Napier’s fee to a quantum meriut basis. But it remanded to determine the value of the New York firm’s services, which must include the value of the referral to Crockett, not just to the client.
What I find interesting about this opinion is that it puts an unexpected twist on Nev. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(e), unmentioned in the opinion but which, according to Stockmeier v. Nev. Dep’t of Corrections, 135 P. 3d 1130 (2006), prohibits fee splitting unless the fees are proportionate the services performed by each attorney. Surely the Nevada Supreme Court intended that the services in question be rendered to the client, not to the attorneys?
Opinion by Nelson, with Berzon and Clifton concurring.
