Appealing in Nevada : Nevada Appellate Lawyer & Attorney : Tami D. Cowden : Nevada Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

The U.S. Supreme Court issued two opinions this weak that arguably weaken Miranda.  However, neither seem a radical departure from previous rulings.

In Maryland v. Shatzer, issued February 24, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court held that where there is a break in custody, police may question a suspect for a second time, eve though the suspect invoked Miranda's right to remain silent during the first period of custody. The ruling weakens the long standing so-called Edwards v. Arizona rule, which had held that once Miranda is invoked , any subsequent waiver of the right resulting from police prompting is deemed involuntary. 

In this case, the suspect, who was in prison,  had invoked his rights while being questioned in 2003, but when questioned again in 2006, waived his rights after being advised again. The Court set a standard for a 14 day break in custody. 

Scalia authored the opinion. Thomas concurred in part, and Stevens concurred in the judgment.

Meanwhile, one day earlier, in Florida v. Powell,  a 7-2 majority upheld  Florida's alternative wording of the Miranda warning, even though it does not explicitly state that a suspect has a right to have an attorney present during questioning. The Florida warning states, as relevant here:

You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions” and “[y]ou have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.  

Ginsberg authored the 7-2 decision; Stevens dissented on both jurisdictional grounds and on the merits;  Breyer joining in the majority decision on the jurisdictional issue, and in the dissent on the merits.

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In Wilkins v. Gaddy, the U.S. Supreme Court held that whether force is “excessive” depends on the level of force applied, not on the level of injury suffered. The District Court had dismissed the prisoner complaint sua sponte, due to the de minimus nature of the alleged injuries, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

In a per curiam decision, the Court stated that “[a]n inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury

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Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down another opinion favoring corporations. In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, issued February 23, 2010, the Court held that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the “nerve center” of a corporation, i.e., where the high level executives direct, control, and coordinate the company’s operations, is the “principal place of business.”   

The Court recognized that the nerve center approach is imperfect, but considers its simplicity and certainty superior to other methods, including the 9^th Circuit’s “plurality of business activity” approach. 

Breyer authored the unanimous opinion.

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In Kucana v. Holder , the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal appellate courts have the jurisdiction to review Justice Department and immigration court decisions not to reopen deportation proceedings. The 7^th Circuit had held  that it lacked jurisdiction to review the administrative determination, holding that 8 U. S. C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review not only of administrative decisions made discretionary by statute, but also of those made discretionary by regulation.

The Court cited "separation of power concerns" in determining that the executive branch does not have the power to limit the jurisdiction of the judiciary.

The opinion, issued January 20, 2009, was authored by Ginsburg with all but Alito joining. Alito concurred on narrower grounds.

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It is a new world for politics, with the 2010 campaign likely to see even more corporate money in play.

In  Citizens United v. FEC, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the requirement  of the McCain Feingold campaign finance act that corporations channel their campaign spending into political action committees rather than directly funding "electrioneering communications."  The ruling overturned two prior decisions by the Court, a 2003 decision upholding the same provision, and a 1990 decision upholding a state law with a similar restriction.  

The McCain-Feingold provision requiring political messages to disclose their funder was upheld. The ruling also does not affect the longstanding federal law  preventing corporations from directly donating to federal political candidates.

Kennedy authored the 5-4 decision issued January 21, 2009.  Stevens authored the dissent, joined by Ginsberg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.

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In Presley v. Georgia,  the U.S. Supreme Court underscored the importance of public access to criminal trials. 

In Presley, over the defendant’s objection, the trial court had excluded a member of the public, who happened to be the defendant’s uncle, because the courtroom was too small to hold both the prospective jurors and the relative without both sitting in the same row. The trial court had been concerned that the jurors could be tainted by such proximity.

The Court ruled per curiam 7-2 that judges must consider alternatives to closing a courtroom during jury selection, even if no party makes any suggestions for how to otherwise address the issue prompting the judge to consider closing the court in the first place. The high court majority said the Georgia Supreme Court had disregarded the U.S. Supreme Court's explicit instructions on that point.

Thomas and Scalia dissented, objecting to the summary disposition of the case.

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 Obviously, in some trials, jurors can develop a real fondness for the judge and the bailiff. Or so one must assume from the gifts given by jurors in

In Wellons, the U.S. Supreme Court  ruled without full briefing or argument, vacating the 11^th Circuit ruling that Wellons’s challenge to his conviction was procedurally barred due to an adverse ruling in his state court habeas proceedings.  That ruling had come before last year’s Supreme Court Cone v. Bell decision, ruling that federal courts should not deny relief on such grounds.

In this case, there had been ex parte contact between the judge who sentenced the defendant to death and the jurors, including a reunion either during or immediately after the penalty phase where the jurors gave the judge and bailiff chocolate in risqué shapes. The judge did not report the contact, and the defendant learned of the matter only post sentencing.  The matter was raised in both the direct appeal and habeas petition, but efforts to obtain discovery into the matter were denied at every level.

The Court began its opinion by noting "From beginning to end, judicial proceedings conducted for the purpose of deciding whether a defendant shall be put to death must be conducted with dignity and respect."  

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