Nebraska bans execution by electric chair

Most states with death penalties are concerned about how the U.S. Supreme Court will rule regarding the use of the lethal injection cocktail.  But Nebraska had no worries there. It has only one method of execution: the electric chair.

But now it has none.  

In State v. Mata, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the use of the electric chair was cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the Nebraska constitution.  

The Nebraska AG, Jon Bruning, vows to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.  One would say this would be fruitless, given the decision was based on state law, and a state’s own high court has the last word on what constitutes state law.  But then there’s always that pesky  precedent of Bush v. Gore…. 

Death penalty upheld in child abuse case

In Lopez v. Stewart, the Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of habeas in a death penalty case out of Arizona.  Lopez was convicted of child abuse and felony murder. Although there is apparently no dispute that Lopez had no intent to kill his son, the sentencing court found no mitigating factors in Lopez’s favor.  The Ninth Circuit found that Lopez had received meaningful appellate review in the state court, and had failed to exhaust certain of his ineffective assistance of counsel issues. However, the Court did expand the Certificate of Appealability to include ineffective assistance with regarding to investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence.

Judge Thomas dissented, finding that both the sentencing court and the Arizona Supreme Court were objectively unreasonable in failing to consider the lack of mens rea as a specific mitigating factor.

 

Ninth Circuit reversed in death penalty case.

In Schriro v. Landrigan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing of the defendant’s claim he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of his trial.

The record reflected that Landrigan interrupted attempts to present mitigating evidence, and asked his wife and mother not to testify. The Ninth Circuit had held, en banc, that these instructions during the penalty phase could not excuse a failure to investigate mitigation prior to trial.

The Supreme Court, with Thomas authoring the opinion, held that Landrigan’s instructions against presenting mitigating evidence prevented any prejudice arising from a failure to investigate. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that the record did not establish that  Landrigan’s instruction that no mitigating evidence be presented was “informed and knowing” was rejected as contradicted by the record, although Thomas also noted that the Supreme Court had never imposed an “informed and knowing” standard upon a defendant’s decision to present evidence.  Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and Alito joined in the opinion.

Stevens drafted the dissent, joined by the remainder of the court. The dissent noted that there has never been disagreement that defense counsel’s failure to obtain thorough psychiatric review was below the standard of representation. Stevens explains that the failure of counsel to investigate mitigation meant that Landrigan did not learn of his psychological condition until year later, even though he may have known of individual facts, such his mother’s use of alcohol during pregnancy, her subsequent abandonment of him, and the childhood mistreatment his suffered.  

Three Texas Death Penalty Cases Overturned by U.S. Supreme Court

In three 5-4 decisions, each with Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito dissenting, the U.S. Supreme Court today overturned three Texas death penalty cases. In each of the cases, the defendant had been convicted through the use of jury instructions which automatically imposed a death sentence if the jury returned affirmative answers to “special issue” questions relating to the whether the murder had been deliberate and whether the defendant posed a danger to society. In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled this instruction scheme unconstitutional where the jury had no ability to consider evidence of mitigation. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989)(Penry I). Today’s decisions reveal the difficulty the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the Fifth Circuit have in interpreting and properly applying Penry I and its progeny.

Smith v. Texas, is the second time the Court overturned the death penalty imposed on Smith. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had reinstated the death penalty after applying a state law harmless error analysis. The lower court found that Smith had not preserved his jury instruction issue, and accordingly, had to show egregious error to prevail.   The U.S. Supreme Court held the lower had misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s previous ruling, which had found the juror instructions used in his trial unconstitutional, which error had not been cured by other instructions. The court made clear that Smith is entitled to relief under federal law.

The other two cases, both federal habeus cases, also resulted in findings that the lower court misapplied Penry I and subsequent cases. In  Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman and Brewer v. Quarterman, the court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s test for Penry claims which required the defendant to have presented “constitutionally relevant” mitigating evidence, which had to be that the defendant suffered uniquely severe permanent handicap to which the criminal act could be attributed