Individuals may seek recovery under ERISA for loss of individual benefits

In LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., the Court ruled ERISA § 409 and § 502(2) permit recovery by an individual who alleges that his own plan benefits were reduced due to fiduciary breaches by a plan administrator. The Court distinguished this situation from that in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, where the participant was promised a fixed benefit. Russell held that when a fixed benefit is promised, only breaches causing a plan default are actionable. Justice Stevens wrote majority opinion; Roberts and Thomas each filed concurring opinion, in which Kennedy and Scalia, respectively, joined.

ERISA plans cannot terminate through merger

In Beck v. PACE Int'l Unionfound nothing in the text of ERISA or the legislative history to support a claim that Congress intended merger to be a permissible means of termination.,  the U.S. Supreme Court held that merger was not a permissible form of termination for single-employer defined benefit plans under ERISA. ERISA permits plan termination only the purchase of irrevocable commitments from an insurer or by providing all benefits under the plan.  The Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the residual provision in 29 U.S.C. 1431(b)(3)(A)(ii), which would permit annuitization, should be construed to permit merger, as such interpretation would be contrary to the interpretation rendered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation(PBGC).  The Court has traditionally deferred to the PBGC.  Moreover, applying simple rules of statutory construction, the Court

 

De Novo review is not a chance to add evidence

In Opeta v. Northwest Airlines Pension Plan, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court decision which had upheld a denial of benefits under the plan. The Court held that the district court erred in admitted evidence extrinsic to the administrative record, as such evidence was not necessary for review. The ERISA plan at issue here gave the final determination of eligibility to an independent physician, who found Opeta permanently and totally disabled.  In a trial de novo before the district court, the Plan presented evidence of a videotape of Opeta performing yard word. The independent physician testified that had he been aware of that evidence, he would not have found Opeta to be totally disabled. However, the admission of this evidence was error, as the Plan could have, but failed to present such evidence to the physician at the time he made his determination.   The district court could have conducted an adequate de novo review of the administrative record without admission of such evidence.