"Me Too" evidence in discrimination cases may be admissible

On Tuesday, Feb. 26, 2008, in Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, the U.S. Supreme Court found the 10th Circuit had erred in concluding that a district court decision had applied a “per se” rule excluding evidence of discriminatory conduct against employees not “similarly situated” to the plaintiff. The Court remanded the matter for clarification by the District Court as to the basis for its exclusion of the evidence.

The ruling makes it clear that “me too” evidence – evidence by other workers for the same company but not working for the same department or supervisors, that they’ve been treated unfairly, it neither per se admissible nor inadmissible under the federal rules. Instead, the admissibility of such evidence is fact-specific, depending upon the nature of the “me too” evidence and its relationship to the specific allegations in the case.

Justice Thomas drafted the opinion for the unanimous court.