There's burglary, and then there's burglary...
In U.S. v. Grisel, the Ninth Circuit held that a conviction for second degree burglary as defined by the State of Oregon is not a categorical burglary offense for purposes of applying the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA). To be a predicate felony under the ACCA, the state crime must fit the generic federal crime. Congress failed to define “burglary,” resulting in the Supreme Court requiring that a generic definition of burglary be used, limiting the crime to unlawful entry into a “building or structure.” Oregon’s definition of “building” for 2d degree burglary includes “booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other structure adapted for overnight accommodations of persona.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.205(1). Because second-degree burglary in Oregon includes offenses outside the generic federal definition of burglary, it cannot be a categorical offense for purposes of the ACCA. Because the offense is not a categorical burglary offense, the case was remanded for determination of whether the facts underlying the conviction satisfy the federal burglary definition.
This decision overrules the Court’s previous decision of U.S. v. Cunningham, 911 F. 2d 361 (9th Cir. 1990).
